Abstract. A certain number of public-key cryptosystems based on errorcorrecting codes have been proposed as an alternative to algorithms based on number theory. In this paper, we analyze algorithms that can be used to attack such cryptosystems in a very precise way, and optimize them. Thus, we obtain some more e cient attacks than those previously known. Even if they remain unfeasible, they indicate the cryptosystems parameters forbidden by the existence of these algorithms.
but the larger class of alternant codes MS83] can also be used). We now choose at random some invertible matrix S and a permutation matrix P. The triplet (S; G; P) will be the secret key and (t;Ĝ = SGP) will be the public key of the cryptosystem. Then, to transmit a k-bits message m, the sender uses the ciphered message c = mĜ e with e a random error of weight at most t. To decipher, the recipient decodes cP ?1 = mSG eP ?1 with his decoding algorithm.
Security The security of this cryptosystem is based on the secrecy of e, and on the fact that the decoding algorithm can only be applied if one knows a canonical form of the generator matrix G. But, if we consider the public matrix G 0 = 0 B B @Ĝ mĜ + e 1 C C A it is the matrix of a linear code of which a minimum weight codeword is e. Hence, an algorithm that can nd the shortest word of a linear code is an attack of the McEliece cryptosystem.
1.3 The J. Stern public key identi cation scheme J. Stern has presented at Crypto'93 a new public-key authentication scheme Ste94] that uses property 1.1. In this scheme, the public key is an (n; k) code parity check matrix H, and each sender receives a secret key consisting in a n-bits word s of weight t. The public key is the decoding syndrome Hs and the sender has to prove that his secret key is of weight t, which can be done without revealing s thanks to the described protocol. As for McEliece cryptosystem, if we have an algorithm that nds codewords of weight t + 1 in a code, we can apply it to the matrix H 0 = ( H j Hs ) until it nds a codeword s with last bit at one. The rst n bits of s then consist of a signature s 0 for the public signature Hs.
Trying to hash with error-correcting codes
An implicit idea in Ste94] is to use error-correcting codes in a hashing way. Given the parity check matrix H of a (n; k) linear code chosen at random, then the minimum weight w of this code can be evaluated by ? n w > 2 n?k . Let us assume that we have a set M of messages to hash such that jMj = ? n m with m > w. Then we can identify each m 2 M with a n-bits word of weight m. Using the property 1.1 we can hash such a message by its n ? k-bits syndrome Hm. Leo88] can be used for any linear code. It uses the generator matrix to nd short codewords through a probabilistic method. The decription below is slightly di erent from those of Leo88], but it is more simple to implement, and it runs a little faster than the original description. Let us assume that the parameters of this algorithm are p and s, then one iteration of the algorithm is as follows:
1. Permute the columns of the generator matrix randomly. 2. Apply a gaussian elimination on the rows of the matrix to obtain this form:
with Z a (s ? k) k matrix.
3. Search combinations of at most p rows of Z that lead to codewords of the restricted code ( I j Z ) of weight less than p.
4. For these codewords, compute the whole word and check its weight.
Work factor We assume that a codeword c of weight w exists. Then the probability that a permutation of the columns leads to a favorable con guration is
For each iteration, an estimation of the number of operations is:
1. k k=2 n for the gaussian elimination. 2.
? k i (i ? 1) additions of (s ? k)-bits words.
3. the average number of cases such that the whole computation is needed is
Consequently, an estimation of the work factor for this algorithm is
2. 1. Permute the columns of the generator matrix randomly. 2. Apply a gaussian elimination on the rows of the matrix to obtain thes form G = ( I k j A ) ; with the corresponding permuted cipher text c = ( c 1 e 1 j c 2 e 2 ) :
3. Guess that the error e 1 is of weight at most p and checks whether the error e = ( e 1 j e 2 ) is of weight w.
Work factor In this case, we are sure that the error e of weight w exists. The probability that a permutation of the columns leads to a favorable con guration is
1. k k=2 n for the gaussian elimination.
? k i i additions on the (n ? k)-bits words of A.
Le(p) (n; k; w) :
2.3 Algorithm of J. Stern Principle This probabilistic algorithm Ste89] can be used for any linear code.
It uses the parity check control matrix. As for the above algorithms, we rst reduce the problem with a gaussian elimination after a random permutation of the columns of the check control matrix:
The idea of the algorithm is to consider Z as a new parity check control matrix. If we nd a short codeword of Z then the corresponding complete codeword of H is a good candidate to be short.
How to nd codewords of Z The original algorithm Ste89] randomly splits the column of Z in two sets X and Y . First, it computes all the linear combinations of p columns of X and stores them. Second, it computes all the linear combinations of p columns of Y and checks the collisions with the stored values. This allows to build codewords of Z of weight 2p.
Work factor In fact it is more simple and more e cient to consider X and Y as the left half and right half of the matrix Z:
Then the probability that an iteration is successful is slightly di erent than the one given in Ste89]:
S(p;`) (n; k; w) = S(p;`) (n; k; w) :
A variant of J. Stern algorithm
How to nd codewords of Z The problem with the above algorithm Ste89] is that it needs great amounts of memory for large dimensions. Besides, the memory access isn't instantaneous. Hence the results in table 4 must be taken with care. But keeping the same principle, one can nd short codewords of Z by considering linear combinations of at most p columns of Z. More generally, if the syndrome of a n ? k-bits word of weight p by Z is of low weight (less than s), then it is possible to build a codeword of H which is a good candidate to be short.
Work factor Let us assume that a codeword c of weight w exists. Then gaussian reduction yields the following form of H:
Then c = ( c 1 j c 2 j c 3 ) must be such that w(c 1 ) s and 1 w(c 3 )
p. The probability that a permutation of the columns leads to a favorable con guration is For each iteration, an estimation of the number of operations is:
1. (n ? k) (n ? k)=2 n for the gaussian elimination.
2.
? k i (i ? 1) additions of`-bits words.
3. The average number of cases such that the whole computation is needed is
Consequently, an estimation of the work factor for this algorithm is W Sv(p;s;`) (n; k; w) =
Sv(p;s;`) (n; k; w) :
3 \Factorization" of the attacks
One can remark that certain attacks may be slightly increased if the number of problems to solve is great. For instance, we can assume in the McEliece cryptosystem that we have several ciphered text to cryptanalyze, let us say N. Then it is possible, once the gaussian elimination has been performed, to achieve the remaining operations of Lee algorithm for the N ciphered text. Hence, the work factor to decrypt one of the N words turns in W 0 Le(p) (N; n; k; w) = k k=2 n + N(n ? k)
This means that cryptanalyzing one cipher text in McEliece cryptosystem requires more work than cryptanalyzing one cipher text among N. , then it is possible to nd very short codewords even in large codes.
On the other hand, the number N (n;k) (w) of codewords of weight w in a (n; k) random code can be estimated by the following formula: N (n;k) (w) ? n w 2 n?k : For su cient large values of w, this number grows enough to allow the algorithms to nd at least one of the codewords. In fact the work factor can be divided by N (n;k) (w). Table 2 shows an estimation of the weights one can nd using the described algorithms. These weights can be seen as the lower and upper bound of the non-accessible codewords area. These results prove that use of codes of large dimensions is not enough to ensure security for cryptosystems based on error-correcting codes. For instance, in the McEliece cryptosystem, the weight of the random error cannot be less than 22. Besides, these results forbid the use of error-correcting codes as hash-functions in the way described in part 1.4. In fact, it is possible to build couples of words of given low weight w that have the same syndrome. 5 Conclusion
We have estimated and improved existing attacks against cryptosystems based on the NP-complete problem of nding codewords of given weight in a linear error-correcting codes. These attacks don't succeed in breaking McEliece's cryptosystem or Stern's authentication scheme, but they forbid the use of some parameters.
